MoSE, a sea of troubles
A cultural and democratic battle to ensure that Venice and her inhabitants can continue to
“live” their lagoon
Cristiano Gasparetto
Acqua Alta.
To understand the phenomenon and the remedies planned it is as well to bear in mind that in Venice
the term acqua alta is used to describe the flooding that affects parts of the city when the
waters of the lagoon are swollen by extraordinarily high tides in the Adriatic.
When the tide reaches 110 centimetres above mean sea level it means that certain thoroughfares will
be covered to a depth of 10-20 centimetres.
Over the last 150 years, this phenomenon has increased in frequency and size because the area of the
lagoon basin has been reduced by almost a third through extensive land reclamation activities
undertaken to build the industrial zone of Marghera and to create new islands in view of its intended
development; further constriction of the lagoon has been caused by the construction of the airport and
the closing off of fish farms to the free flow of tides in order to privatise them.
Other actions that have influenced the overall hydrodynamics of the lagoon include the dredging of
long, deep channels, the construction of jetties at the inlets between sea and lagoon and the
continuous deepening of these inlets; at the same time the authorities have failed to follow the
centuries-long example of the Venetian Republic and carry out the necessary maintenance of the defence
measures already in place on the seaward and mainland sides of the lagoon. These are the real,
human-generated causes that led, in the extreme weather conditions of November 1966, to terrible
flooding from tides that reached 194 centimetres a.m.s.l..
Despite the fact that laws were passed – and they are still in force though not obeyed – which
stipulate that all actions affecting the lagoon should be gradual, experimental and reversible,
the authorities exploited the pressure created by world opinion horrified at the possible loss of a
unique city such as Venice (and flouted EC regulations) to establish a Sole Agency to deal with the
matter. This consortium of major Italian companies was given the task of studying the problem,
proposing solutions, designing those chosen and now, building the so-called MoSE system; the
concession provided neither for any appraisal of alternative solutions, nor for independent monitoring
of the quality of the work produced. The MoSE flood prevention system consists of 79 huge submerged
flaps – each higher than the Church of St. Mark’s – which are hinged to caissons laid across the beds
of the inlets and secured with 12,000 piles driven in to depths of over 40 metres; when tides
exceeding 110 cm a.m.s.l. are forecast, the flaps are designed to rise on their hinges to prevent the
tide entering the lagoon. In addition, the system provides for an artificial island on the lagoon side
of the Lido inlet, complementary breakwaters on the sea side and shipping locks beside the barriers.
Italia Nostra and the main Italian environmental associations have opposed this project from the outset
on the grounds that it does not remove the real causes of acque alte and that the result of the
physical transformation work required to install the system will be an increase in the frequency and
depth of the acque alte when the flaps are not in operation. MoSE therefore is a dangerous system: it
works against the purpose it is intended for; it is extremely expensive (an estimated € 4.2 billion
to build, and a further € 30 million a year, for 100 years, to maintain); and it will have the
destructive effect of turning the lagoon into an extension of the sea. It was approved by the
political will of parliament alone,a decision that should not in any case have been taken in the
absence of an Environmental Impact Assessment (a previous EIA, annulled because of a procedural flaw,
had comprehensively rejected the project and no new assessment was carried out) and in breach of
numerous local town and country planning regulations and European environmental rules. But our
opposition is now firmer than ever, above all because there are other ways of coming seriously to
grips with acque alte, with projects that comply with the laws, that can be put to the test before
being put into effect, that are much quicker and cheaper to install and that are environmentally
compatible. Venice City Council, which has officially noted both the illegitimacy of the procedures
underlying the project and the far-reaching environmental changes it is already causing, has
commissioned an expert appraisal of the efficiency of alternative projects compared with MoSE: of
the fourteen projects examined, MoSE came last but one in terms of efficiency.
Priority must go, we believe, to reducing the quantity and force of the water entering the lagoon and
to differentiating these between the three inlets according to their use. Studies acquired by the
City Council and never contested show that by raising the beds of the inlets, especially at the
northernmost Lido channel, tides can be reduced by up to 21 cm and acque alte can be reduced from
the current 70-80 a year to just 1 or 2, as it was some 150 years ago.
It is planned to bring MoSE into action only when tide level is expected to exceed 110 cm a.m.s.l.;
this will eliminate 2 or 3 acque alte a year, on average, and during the last two years, for
example, it would not have eliminated any. Raising the bed of the Lido inlet would not only save Venice
from acque alte but would also prevent
giant cruise ships from sailing through St. Mark’s Basin. As it is now, these 300-metre-long,
40-metre-high vessels destroy the bed of the lagoon and pollute the air (each produces the same
emissions as 15,000 cars), and the risk of collision represents a constant threat to the historic
palazzi lining the banks. Whereas in a short space of time and at a reasonable cost (compared with
that of MoSE), a tourist vessel harbour could be built in or on the shore of the Adriatic.
It is now generally acknowledged that the greenhouse effect will result in a rise in average sea
levels over the next 100 years. Estimates of the rise range from 10 to 80 centimetres, but adopting
the cautious assumption that tides will be 40-50 cm higher, it is calculated (by Pirazzoli of the
French National Research Council) that MoSE will have to be closed on over 150 days a year; traffic
destined for Porto Marghera, which passes through the Marghera inlet many times a day, would thus
become wholly uncompetitive and the eco-compatible conversion of the industrial zone would be rendered
pointless. Another effect of this scenario would be a decrease of water exchange so the entire lagoon
would become a cess-pit (the inhabited parts of the lagoon have no sewage treatment and disposal
facilities) and would be further polluted by the pesticides washed into it from the 98 municipal areas
in the drainage basin on its mainland side.
At the time of writing (October 2007), the construction of MoSE has not yet begun (so much is obvious
from any on-site inspection, pace government Ministers and the fellow-travelling press). It is true
that the complementary works have been almost completely finished, but if the project were halted
now these could still be converted to other, more useful functions. An example: the shipping locks
could be transformed into moorings for the powerful launches that now destroy the bed of the lagoon
with their bow-waves and screw-wash; in this way they would exit directly into the sea and avoid the
lagoon altogether.
The Minister of the Environment has formally taken note of another illegal practice associated with
MoSE: the fact that sites for the construction of prefabricated elements have been set up at the sides
of the inlets, devastating many hectares of environmentally restricted land which is also protected
under European regulations (and not even the subsequent approval issued by the Commission for the
Safeguarding of Venice nor the opinion of the Superintendency of the Environmental Heritage make it
any the less illegal).
A determined act of institutional stewardship is now, more than ever, timely and possible.
On the basis of the documented revelation of this latest illegality, the Mayor of Venice and the
Minister of the Environment must stop the work (the State Auditors’ Department is also reported to
have instituted an enquiry).
This would initiate a phase – appropriate, incidentally, for a Government whose Programme proclaims
the need for action to take place with the consent of local institutions – with a new strategic vision
for the life and use of the lagoon, one which is compatible with man and his activities, with nature
and with its bio-rhythms.
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Venice: future overcast
Gherardo Ortalli
Venice! Centuries of resolute effort went into creating it and now it seems that destruction of
the distinctive features that make the city so extraordinarily unique is taking no more than a few
decades. There is no doubt that the houses, the calli, the churches and the palazzi will continue
to exist; the income they can generate if skilfully exploited by the market is certain to guarantee
their survival. What point would there be in destroying a money-making machine? What is rapidly and
perhaps irreversibly wasting away is not so much bricks and mortar as the city as a living organism
and the witness it still bears to outstandingly civilized values and a matchless cultural heritage,
none of which can even remotely be quantified in monetary terms.
A long series of troubled events had to run their course before Venice put down roots amid the
brackish waters of the lagoon, starting with the invasions of the V and VI centuries that swept aside
the Roman Empire and set in motion the movement of people searching for safety and which led to the
new settlements on the islands of the Lagoon. Then there was a wait until the VIII century turned into
the IX before the island-dwellers around Rialto began to develop the functions characteristic of an
urban centre; and only at the beginning of the X century did the people of the time start to refer to
the settlement as a city. This was the civitas Rivoalti, the “city of Rialto”, which grew to become
the heart of one of the most highly esteemed states in Europe.
Long years of fortune and success eventually gave way to more difficult times.
The crisis following the fall of the Serenissima Repubblica in 1797, in the Napoleonic period, brought
dramatic impoverishment, also as regards works of art. Thousands at a time were sold at auction.
State papers of 1811 record that the Gentile Bellini polyptych at the Church of San Zulian was sold
off for 20 lire! Economic recovery later in the XIX century, and the phase of industrialization
in the period dominated by Cini and Volpi revived matters to some extent but then the capital
(and control) of the great corporate engines passed increasingly into outside hands. Even the great
hotels went the same way.
All that’s left to today’s Venetians are indeed the bricks and mortar, and even these
(though they do still remain – in part – under Venetian control) are being bought up, more and more
by non-Venetians who know how to invest their money shrewdly (with the spin-off of being able to
spend a few days a year in a dream city). It matters little that another side-effect of these
out-of-control mechanisms is the expulsion of residents; people coming from outside see the city
full of people and find it difficult to understand that in fact the population is draining away.
A few figures will quickly adjust the perspective: immediately after the Second World War there
were 178,000 inhabitants and in 1960 there were still 145,000; now they don’t even reach 60,000.
The average age is rising all the time and young people and the more vulnerable members of society
are being systematically excluded, the victims of an apparently unstoppable process.
And what sort of a city is one emptied of its inhabitants?
This raises the old question of what we are trying to save in safeguarding Venice, for Venice is
an amalgam of many things. It is a marvellous museum, a splendid built environment with matchlessly
memorable views, a whole series of traditional activities, a dialect of its own, a exceptional place
to pursue studies, a way of being born, living and dying that the rest of the world does not know or
has forgotten. To save a museum or a scenic view or a dialect may be important to some, but we believe
that the exceptional quality of Venice lies in its embodiment of all these things (and more besides)
and therefore that really to safeguard Venice means safeguarding its complex whole, not single
elements, however extraordinary they may be. Every aspect deserves respect if the ultimate object
of our effort is to protect the delicately balanced whole.
There is no question but that certain elements of the system are more delicate than others.
To start with there is Venice’s special relationship with water: symbiosis with the sea and the
lagoon characterized its birth and development and defence of the city still involves defence of
the waters that have always been both friend and potential enemy. A dramatic example of this is
provided by the events that followed the great flood that brought the city to its knees in 1966,
events which unfortunately show that the authorities were simply not up to dealing with the problems
at their real level of seriousness. Six years of studies led to the Special Law for Venice
(no. 171 of 1973), which identified safeguarding actions that were considered so urgent that the
government policy statements approved in 1975 provided for extraordinary procedures to ensure their
immediate implementation.
One of the measures ordered was action to modify the cross-section of the channels through which the
sea enters the lagoon, reducing their depth and therefore the tidal flow; another was to reopen the
fish farms, unused reclaimed land and the other enclosures, many of them unauthorized, to the spread
of the tide (such areas still occupy a third of the total lagoon area); and petrol tankers were to be
excluded from the lagoon, thus making it possible to fill in the “highway” that had been dredged to
enable them to reach Marghera and which had transformed much of the lagoon into sea. All these were
relatively economical, technically simple actions; they were also reversible and involved no risks.
But what with futile protests and a torrent of idle talk, nothing was done. The ineptitude of the
public authorities at all levels was evident, but the story did not end there.
One of the provisions of the 1973 law was that if the urgent measures
(which shamefully remained ignored and unimplemented) in fact proved unable to guarantee the safety
of the city studies should be undertaken to determine whether barriers at the lagoon entrances could
do the job. So the authorities that had done nothing to carry out what the law had required of them
now had the brilliant idea of “starting again from scratch”: starting the house from the roof!
In the ‘80s a private consortium of large companies was given the task of investigating the possibility
of installing mobile dams. Then the Consorzio Venezia Nuova was made sole concessionaire for all
safeguarding work, a move than many judged to be a monstrous mistake, not only because it created a
de facto monopoly but also because the Italian State (which, as commissioner of the work, is
responsible – and must therefore accept the associated guilt – for everything that is, or is not, done)
was consequently in contravention of its inalienable duty, established in Article 9 of the
Constitution, to safeguard our cultural heritage.
And so began the long-debated issue of MOSE. There have been innumerable protests and technical
objections from all parts, but in the end, it requires no more than common sense at least to wonder
why, before setting off on extraordinarily complex, extremely expensive works which were, in practice,
non-reversible and of debatable effectiveness, the provisions of the 1973 were not first implemented
and put to the test. And those with a taste for paradoxes will note how Italia Nostra was deviously
(or stupidly) accused of being the “party of inaction” whereas in fact, faced with the inertia and
the web of vested interests that blocked every action, it was Italia Nostra that for years demanded,
insisted and shouted that the work envisaged by the law should be carried out. And if now many
influential people, including many public officials, are raising their voices against MOSE, one is
entitled to wonder where they were 30 or 20 or 10 years ago when something might still have been
done about it.
The promptness that made Italia Nostra the first to pose the problem of the need for action to
be taken to protect the city from water and from any repetition of the events of 1966
(long before the current dispute over MOSE) deserves to be mentioned because amongst the things
for which the Association can take credit is having understood immediately, and often before anyone
else, the poor decisions that were being taken and the consequent dangers threatening Venice. And
here it’s worth at least recalling that such was the case when the plan was to double the size of the
petrochemical industry in Porto Marghera (where, incidentally, phosgene still presents a risk).
Italia Nostra was also in the front line of the battle to stop the disastrous (and fortunately failed)
project to fill in a substantial part of the lagoon for a new industrial zone. It was the same when
the plans to dredge the channel for the oil-tankers – the Canale dei Petroli – were announced,
and the Association presented the first (and for a long time the only) opposition to ENI’s plans to
extract gas from beneath the Northern Adriatic, with its attendant risks of serious subsidence.
Again it gave the lead (though no-one followed) in attempting to break the Consorzio Venezia Nuova’s
monopoly of action to safeguard the lagoon by taking the matter up in Brussels
(where the action was carefully, and with unseemly ambiguity, buried). And it was the first to
draw attention to the fact that a city cannot be saved by expelling its inhabitants.
These are difficult battles, often against local administrations and government decisions whose
mistakes can now be measured by the seriousness of the current situation. The Association has also
enjoyed significant support and been involved in bitter clashes, some of them in court, as in the
case of the famous trials that saw the Association as co-defendant with Indro Montanelli, pointlessly
put in the dock by administrators whose mediocrity has already been judged as such by history.
All this is part of a difficult past. But if that was the past, the present is no happier!
Today the city is increasingly weak, fragile and tired. The old problems are slow to be resolved,
and new ones are always cropping up. Many of the actions that pass under the name of “safeguarding”
are transforming the lagoon into a rigid system, deprived of that flexibility it needs to survive.
Mudbanks become islands edged with concrete camouflaged with wood. The lagoon is becoming more and more
like an artificial basin and the lesson taught by centuries of experience is being forgotten: that its
natural evolution must by accompanied by low-impact, reversible actions that can always be adjusted
if necessary. Instead of being made inert and harmless, sludge with high toxic content, dredged from
the lagoon off Marghera, is being used to create new islands or the odd hill on which
(because we are all ecologically responsible) pretty green copses will be planted. Massive public
works projects with their huge financial commitments, like the Calatrava bridge, make an incisive
impression in media terms but are of such small practical use that it is difficult to see them as
other than fig leaves to conceal shame!
Of course, the picture is not entirely gloomy. After years of inertia, the process of maintaining
the city’s canals was restarted well over a decade ago. The City Council has carried out a good
policy of support for the restoration of residential accommodation. Monumental buildings are better
looked after than in the past. But the balance is still negative and the problems multiply.
Nowadays, for example, tourism is becoming an unbearable burden, totally out of scale with the
city’s ability to deal with it.
At this point, tourism is not so much a resource as a cause of further decay.
And it is a mere illusion that it represents an economic help to Venice.
In large part, the benefits are reaped by individuals and social groups who have no interest in
spending to offset the problems of tourism and it is left to the public purse to cover the hidden
costs of services that have in any case to be provided. Then there is the wear and tear on the physical
fabric of the city: the paving of St.Mark’s Square has suffered more damage over the last decade than
in the previous two centuries!
Then there is the danger represented by the enormous cruise liners that now sail through the
Giudecca Canal and St. Mark’s Basin, where previously not even a barge was allowed to pass. It would
be so easy to keep these huge floating skyscraper-hotels outside the lagoon and ferry their thousands
of passengers in on boats of a reasonable size, but how then would the travel agents be able to
advertise packages including “Venice seen from above”? And no matter that entering Venice in such a
fashion brings no understanding whatever of a city that was conceived and constructed in relation to
the expanse of water around it and to sea/ground level. Venice continues to be held in a mesh of
powerful vested interests, of scant cultural awareness and of culpable inefficiency. The commitment
required is ever more onerous, but then again Italia Nostra was born to fight the difficult battles.
And there are some that simply cannot be lost because the loser would not be our Association but
the nation.
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(*) by John Millerchip
WORKS IN PROGRESS